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Abstract The potential of surveillance practices to undermine the presumption of inno-
cence is a growing concern amongst critics of surveillance. This paper attempts to assess the
impact of surveillance on the presumption of innocence. It defends an account of the
presumption of innocence as a protection against wrongful criminalisation against alterna-
tives, and considers both the ways in which surveillance might undermine that protection
and the—hitherto overlooked—ways in which it might promote it. It draws on empirical
work on the causes of erroneous convictions to suggest that surveillance can be used in
ways that prevent innocent people being erroneously charged and convicted with crimes, by
providing a source of exculpatory evidence for use in police investigations. It is argued that
surveillance practices do not necessarily undermine the presumption of innocence but can
be reformed in ways that both reduce the risk that they will cause wrongful criminalisation
and increase their power to protect those already under suspicion.
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It is of paramount importance that law enforcement agencies should take full
advantage of the available techniques of modern technology and forensic science.
Such real evidence has the inestimable value of cogency and objectivity. It is in
large measure not affected by the subjective defects of other testimony. It enables
the guilty to be detected and the innocent to be rapidly eliminated from enquiries.
– Lord Steyn [2004] UKHL 39
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The words of Lord Steyn draw our attention to something seldom acknowledged:
that the use of evidence gathered by surveillance technologies can protect us against
being wrongfully suspected or convicted of crimes. To the extent that his assertion is
correct, it should lead us to revise our assessments of the costs and benefits of
surveillance. In particular, it should lead us to recognise that, as well as increasing
security, surveillance can be used in ways that protect important civil liberties—in this
case, freedom from wrongful criminalisation.
Freedom from wrongful criminalisation has traditionally been protected via the legal
principle of the presumption of innocence. This paper draws on recent empirical work
on the causes and prevention of erroneous convictions to show how it may also be
protected by the use of evidence gathered by surveillance technologies. The implica-
tions of this claim for overall assessments of the impact of surveillance on the
presumption of innocence are considered in the light of recent attempts by surveillance
scholars to demonstrate the corrosive effects of its use on that principle.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, current debates around the proper understanding of
the presumption of innocence are outlined. Then, reasons are given in support of the account
of the presumption of innocence as a principle protecting citizens against wrongful
criminalisation by the state. This account is defended against alternatives, in particular those
grounding the presumption in a right of citizens to be trusted. The claim that surveillance
undermines the presumption of innocence is then assessed. Criticisms of surveillance that
rest on assertions that it necessarily treats people as presumptively untrustworthy or criminal
are rejected. It is argued that surveillance can be done in ways that do not undermine the
presumption of innocence, and that mass surveillance is generally practiced in ways that are
less undermining of the presumption of innocence than targeted surveillance.
The paper then draws on the results of recent empirical work on the causes of
erroneous charges and convictions to illustrate that surveillance data can and should be
used to protect the presumption of innocence, by providing evidence to exculpate those
suspected of or charged with crimes. The final section of the paper considers the
implications of what has been argued for our understanding of the impact of surveil-
lance practices on the presumption of innocence. It argues that, despite the apparently
contradictory impacts of surveillance on the presumption of innocence, measures
designed to reduce the risk of the former need not inhibit the latter. On the contrary,
a reduction in the use of surveillance that undermines the presumption of innocence is
compatible with an increase in the use of surveillance that protects it.
1 The Presumption of Innocence in Debates About Surveillance
Privacy has traditionally been the core interest or value thought to be threatened by
surveillance practices (Warren and Brandeis 1890; Westin 1967; Jarvis-Thomson
1975). In recent years, equality and norms of antidiscrimination have also become a
focus of scholarly concern (Lyon 2002; Bou-Habib 2008; Ryberg 2011). Today, a new
strand of critique focuses on the presumption of innocence, presenting it it as the latest
of our freedoms to become a casualty of surveillance practices (Minaj and Bonnici
2014; Galetta and de Hert 2012; Pavone and Pereira 2008).
Specific surveillance practices which have been criticised as undermining or
curtailing the presumption of innocence include the mass monitoring of electronic
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communications represented by the US National Security Agency’s PRISM pro-
gramme (EU Parliament 20131); retention of telecommunications data as prescribed
by the EU Data Retention Directive2 (Minaj and Bonnici 2014); the use of ANPR
(license-plate recognition cameras) and open-street CCTV (Haggerty and Ericson
1997: 42; Monahan 2010:99; Galetta 2013: 280); and the use by telecommunications
companies of deep packet inspection (DPI) techniques to detect illegal file sharing
(Fuchs 2012: 50; Privacy International 2009).
Scholars identify a range of ways in which the presumption of innocence is apparently
undermined by these practices. Some point to the stigmatising effects on those surveilled
as criminal or potentially criminal (Campbell 2010). Others point to the implication of
untrustworthiness visited on innocent individuals (Nance 1994; Duff 2013). Others still
identify and object to the creation of an ‘ethos’ or ‘culture’ of suspicion (Kimmelman
2000; Minaj and Bonnici 2014) or to an ‘erosion’ of the trust that forms the basis of social
relationships in a liberal society (Lyon 1994). These critiques all share an expansive
interpretation of the presumption of innocence. They all argue that the presumption of
innocence should not be understoodmerely in narrow legal terms, as a particular aspect of
the right of defendants to a fair trial. Instead, they argue, it should also be understood as a
general moral entitlement, part of which is protected via a legal right.
These reconceptualisations of the presumption of innocence have been criticised by
legal theorists who worry about the unintended consequences of expansive interpreta-
tions. One major concern is that the normative clout of the presumption of innocence as
a legal principle will be undermined by attempts to extend its protections from those at
risk of the serious injustice of wrongful conviction to those at risk of, for example, the
rather mundane intrusion of being subject to CCTV surveillance. It is not hard to see
how this might occur. Currently, the presumption of innocence enjoys the legal status of
a fundamental right and is thus treated as resistant to pressures from moderate increases
in utility (e.g. in the number of guilty people convicted) that proposed restrictions to it
may yield. But moderate increases in security may be thought quite reasonably to
justify measures that risk visiting measures of suspicion such as increased CCTV
surveillance or inclusion on police databases. Conflating the protection of the innocent
from wrongful conviction with the protection of the innocent from suspicion or mistrust
risks eroding commitments to the former in light of the relative triviality of the latter.
Conversely, claims that surveillance undermines the presumption of innocence may
well encourage, amongst those not versed in the details of the debate, the mistaken
view that it actually results in greater numbers of miscarriages of justice, thus leading
people to object to it with a force stronger than is properly merited.
Theorists who are moved by these concerns tend to favour limiting the scope of the
presumption of innocence to the legal rules of trial, namely the rule that the burden of
proof should be borne by the state. This limited presumption of innocence remains
undiluted, thus retaining its moral and legal force and continuing to enjoy the status of a
1 In 2013, the EU Parliament announced the launch of an inquiry into the compatibility of PRISM, declaring
‘The Civil Liberties Committee inquiry [will] assess the impact of the alleged surveillance activities on EU
citizens’ right to privacy and data protection, freedom of expression, the presumption of innocence and the
right to an effective remedy,’ (EU Parliament quoted in the Inquirer, 9th July 2013).
2 ‘Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of
data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications
services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC’
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fundamental right, which can only be restricted in exceptional circumstances. Accord-
ing to those who favour this approach, those concerned about stigmatisation or mistrust
should stick to talking about stigmatisation and mistrust and any attempts of theirs to
help themselves to the considerable rhetorical force of the presumption of innocence
should be resisted.
Some of those who favour expansive readings of the presumption of innocence have
attempted to meet these concerns by claiming that there is no single presumption but
rather a range of presumptions, each of which protects people from different aspects of
unfair coercion by the state in the name of criminal justice (Duff 2013). This move
recasts the presumption of innocence as an umbrella principle, which includes protec-
tions against wrongful conviction alongside protections against wrongful mistrust or
suspicion. The success of this move is questionable, though its conciliatory and
inclusive spirit is welcome. This is partly because it deflects rather than addresses the
problem of the normative status of the presumption: while before we were faced with
the difficulty of agreeing about how important ‘the’ presumption is, we are now faced
with the difficulty of deciding how important each presumption is and how they relate
to each other.
Unfortunately, the proliferation of presumptions of innocence has not been accom-
panied by the kind of normative analysis that sets out the importance of the interests or
values protected by each presumption and the seriousness of the apparent moral harm
or wrong done to these by surveillance techniques. As a result, the multiple-
presumptions approach invites normative paralysis if, upon examination, it turns out
that surveillance practices undermine one presumption of innocence while at the same
time protecting or promoting another.
The difficulties faced by the multiple presumptions approach could be avoided
partially if we jettisoned the language of presumptions of innocence altogether and
focussed instead on describing the specific burdens we want to highlight. It may be
argued that these burdens—of stigmatisation, of privacy intrusions—are what make
surveillance problematic, rather than the fact that they are called by a particular name.
Yet neither is this move entirely satisfactory, for it denies the commonality between this
particular class of burdens imposed by surveillance, a commonality which many
identify intuitively with infringements or diminishment of the presumption of inno-
cence and which undeniably resonates both within and beyond scholarship. What
might this commonality consist in?
A recent stand of legal philosophy conceptualises the presumption of innocence as a
protection against wrongful criminalisation (Tadros 2007; Tomlin 2013). This approach
restricts the scope of the presumption to criminal justice, rather than (as we shall see
with trust-based accounts) a basic principle of interpersonal morality that also happens
to apply to state-citizen relations. Yet it also broadens the scope of the presumption of
innocence beyond the confines of the trial to apply to all criminalising state practices,
potentially including surveillance. This approach has a number of advantages that make
it an attractive option. For example, it seems to capture and express well people’s core
concerns about the impact on the presumption of innocence of contemporary surveil-
lance practices: people invoke the presumption of innocence not merely because
surveillance often involves paying attention to individuals in a way that interferes with,
say, privacy but that it does so in the name of an implied criminality of some sort. It is
this perceived criminalisation of those interfered with that both unites contemporary
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objections to surveillance practices and makes them continuous conceptually with
objections to wrongful conviction. In addition, accepting the wrongful criminalisation
account enables us to move beyond debates about whether or not those objecting to
surveillance can legitimately lay claim to the presumption of innocence in support of
their cause: they can, if they can demonstrate that surveillance practices criminalise
people unfairly.
This paper will endorse the wrongful criminalisation account of the presumption of
innocence. But before it can do so, it must first defend that account against its most
prominent current alternative, namely the trust-based account. In what follows I point
out what I argue is a serious problem with that account and suggest that we should
reject it. Many of the current criticisms of surveillance practices that appeal to the
presumption of innocence speak of their inevitable negative impact on trust. My
rejection of the trust-based account will also involve a rejection of some of these
criticisms. I then apply the reasoning used to reject those criticisms of surveillance
practices to the question of whether surveillance practices undermine the presumption
of innocence by criminalising people wrongfully.
2 The Presumption of Innocence as a Right to be Trusted
As mentioned above, some legal theorists, notably Nance (1994) and Duff (2013), have
attempted to recast the presumption of innocence as a moral right to be treated as
trustworthy (for more recent proponents of this view, see Stewart 2014; DeAngelis
2014). Specifically, the right to be treated as trustworthy has been justified as a corollary
of either the ‘principle of civility’ or the ‘principle of civic trust’, or both. Nance argues
that the principle of civility imposes a duty on all people to treat each other as if they
have been and are acting in accordance with their important social obligations, including
but not limited to respect for the criminal law (Nance 1994). Failure to treat people in
ways consistent with the principle of civility presumption equates to a failure to accord
them ‘dignity associated with the status of membership in the community that is
governed by the norms whose breach is at issue’ (Nance 1994: 653).
Building on Nance’s work, Antony Duff proposes grounding the presumption of
innocence in the principle of civic trust. This principle is very similar to the principle of
civility, but it includes a duty to treat people as if they will continue to act in accordance
with their important obligations. This makes the principle of civic trust forward-
looking, unlike the principle of civility, which is purely retrospective. According to
Duff, failure to accord people appropriate civic trust is to fail to treat them ‘as agents
who can recognise, and guide their actions by, appropriate reasons for action’ (Duff:
10). In other words, failure to presume people innocent of norm-breaking behaviour or
intentions is incompatible with respect for them as moral agents: as people who can
recognise and be guided by moral reasons not to do certain things, like engage in
actions that cause harms to others, of which crimes are paradigmatic.
The claim that a failure to trust people equates to actively mistrusting them
(DeAngelis 2014) is a persistent feature of accounts of the right to be trusted. Criticisms
of surveillance often involve this claim, asserting that the fact that surveillance inter-
feres in the absence of individualised suspicion means it subverts the presumption of
innocence by presuming everyone to be guilty (understood as untrustworthy) until the
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evidence it reveals proves otherwise. Thus, for example, Norris argued in his testimony
to the UK House of Lords’ inquiry into surveillance that mass surveillance ‘promotes
the view…that everybody is untrustworthy. If we are gathering data on people all the
time on the basis that they may do something wrong, this is promoting the view that as
citizens we cannot be trusted’ (Norris in House of Lords 2009: 27[107]; see also
Monahan 2010:99; Norris and Armstrong 1999:24). Mass or indiscriminate surveil-
lance such as the use of open-street CCTV is also said to cast a shadow of mistrust or
suspicion over populations (Minaj and Bonnici 2014: 421).
But the claim that failure to actively trust equates to active mistrust is a fallacy. It
assumes, mistakenly, that trust and distrust are the only two trust-related attitudes it is
possible to adopt. In fact, they exist at opposite ends of a spectrum of attitudes. As
Ullmann-Margalit points out in her 2002 article on this issue, in our relations with other
people, we usually require grounds for trusting or mistrusting people, usually in the
form of evidence drawn from our knowledge of their character or past conduct. When
such evidence is lacking or insufficient, adopting an attitude that lies somewhere
between trust and mistrust and acting in ways that reflect that attitude is reasonable
and fair. Indeed, it would be unreasonable to require individuals to treat each other as
trusted in the absence of evidence demonstrating trustworthiness. It would be equally
unreasonable to require police to treat all individuals for whom there is no individually
incriminating evidence of wrongdoing as if there existed evidence of their innocence
with respect to the criminal law. But asserting a right to be trusted, as Duff and Nance
do, implies that that is precisely what morality does require.
The nuanced view of trust elaborated by Ullman-Margalit is lent support by the
work of social psychologist Toshio Yamagishi, whose seminal study distinguishes
mistrust—that is, the assumption that someone cannot be trusted—from vigilance—
that is, the prudent seeking of assurances in the absence of a prior basis on which to
trust (Yamagishi 2011: 28). Yamagishi’s work reflects better our psychological and
social practices than assertions of a crude dichotomy between trust and mistrust. It can
help us to distinguish between those practices of surveillance that communicate
mistrust and those that should be interpreted as vigilance. Let us consider how.
Yamagishi’s account of trust, mistrust, and vigilance can help us to provide a
rationale for those surveillance practices that involve requiring people to prove their
credentials in the advance of accessing certain goods or areas. One example is airport
security practices. It would be wrong to claim that people are required to go through
security checks at airports because there is an assumption that everyone who travels by
air is suspicious or untrustworthy. Rather, such measures provide the necessary assur-
ances people need in order for them to agree to engage in a potentially highly
dangerous collective activity. Similar points can be made about surveillance that serves
to protect the vulnerable from harm. As I have argued elsewhere, individuals who wish
to work with children are not required to submit to criminal record checks on the
ground that their desire to work with children makes them suspicious (Hadjimatheou
2014). Rather, such checks demonstrate a recognition that children are vulnerable and
deserve special protection.
As this suggests, a belief in untrustworthiness is not necessarily the only or even the
most rational explanation for these kinds of mass surveillance practices. The use of ID
cards, CCTV, ANPR, data retention practices, and so on are compatible with
the belief that the vast majority of people are well-intentioned, law-abiding citizens
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who are of no interest to the criminal justice authorities. While it is true that they
necessarily rest on an assumption that some criminal wrongdoing will be engaged in by
someone, this merely reflects the facts. To assume otherwise would be not only
irrational but a dereliction by states of the duty to protect individuals from crime. For
this reason, it seems wrong to claim that such practices, merely in virtue of the fact that
they involve some monitoring of the population, treat everyone as presumptively
untrustworthy.
To push the point a bit further, let us imagine what a policy that did presume that all
people are guilty of criminal transgressions would look like. Surely, it would look most
like policies put in place to control inmates in a prison. Indeed, a presumption of guilt
would support a policy of literally watching people all of the time and thus look similar to
Bentham’s infamous panopticon or Orwell’s Big Brother, both of which were designed to
control those already proven to be guilty and therefore presumptively untrustworthy.Most
current uses by liberal democracies of surveillance by state security agents come nowhere
near to being as comprehensive, intrusive, or communicative of mistrust as that. A great
deal of information about us is indeed collected, but by a diverse range of separate
agencies and for diverse reasons; there is no single consciousness, individual or corporate,
that is aware of our every move. To be sure, police forces often express a desire to increase
access to sources of information. But on-going debate about this issue in liberal parlia-
ments and recent wranglings with technology companies illustrate that it is by no means
inevitable that they will ever get it (The Guardian, 14 March 2016). The fact that most
crimes not only go unsolved and unpunished, but are never brought to the attention of
criminal justice agencies, further illustrates how far from Orwell’s all-perceiving thought
police we still are (UK Office for National Statistics 2013: 1–2).
Let us take stock for a moment of what has been argued and what we have learnt about
the presumption of innocence and the effect of surveillance on it. In the preceding section, it
was proposed that the wrongful criminalisation account of the presumption of innocence
presented a sound basis for contemporary understanding of the principle. In this section,
arguments have been put forward suggesting that its main rival interpretation, the trust-based
account of the presumption of innocence, is unsound conceptually. From now onwards, the
paper will proceed on the assumption that these arguments are correct and that the wrongful
criminalisation account of the presumption of innocence should be embraced.
This section has also argued that, contrary to what is claimed by critics of surveil-
lance who appeal to that account, mass surveillance practices do not necessarily treat
people as presumptively untrustworthy. In the following section, I extend these latter
arguments to the question of whether surveillance practices undermine the presumption
of innocence by criminalising people wrongfully.
3 Surveillance and Wrongful Criminalisation
Wrongful criminalisation was defined above as treating someone as if they have a
particular propensity towards criminality or indeed are already involved in criminal
activity, without proper grounds for doing so. Wrongful criminalisation is at its worst
when it results in the conviction of innocents, something that the legal right to be
presumed innocent is designed to prevent (Stumer 2010), and at its mildest when it
results in minor interferences with privacy. Whether or not something qualifies as
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wrongful criminalisation will depend both on how we actually treat criminals and what
counts as proper grounds for treating someone as criminal. In relation to the latter issue,
we can say that proper grounds consist in evidence is reliable enough and that indicates
criminality strongly enough to justify the particular preventive or punitive measure
proposed. Thus, in Anglo-American jurisdictions, ‘reasonable suspicion’ might be the
epistemic threshold for arrest, while ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ is that for conviction.
The question of whether surveillance practices wrongfully criminalise people will be
answered by reference to these notions. Finally, in order to answer the question fully,
we need to consider whether surveillance practices result in wrongful criminalisation
necessarily or whether they can in principle be used without doing so.
Many of the claims just put forward in relation to the implications for trustworthi-
ness of mass or indiscriminate surveillance practices apply to their implications for
wrongful criminalisation. It is difficult for conceptual reasons to show that mass
surveillance practices criminalise people wrongfully. Criminality is deviant or trans-
gressive by definition, and (in liberal democracies at least) the belief that everyone is
criminal would imply that the criminal law has failed to keep up with societal norms
and should be reformed. Even in authoritarian, illiberal societies that practice highly
intrusive forms of mass surveillance designed to deter and detect dissenters, it seems
more accurate to describe such practices as implying that people are enemies of the
state rather than criminals. There is something wrong with those practices, but it is
debatable whether it is wrongful criminalisation. In any case, it seems reasonable to
conclude that mass surveillance need not criminalise people wrongfully and therefore
that it is not in principle incompatible with the presumption of innocence.
Things become more complicated when we consider surveillance practices that
single out certain groups or individuals for monitoring or similar differential treatment.
Any measure that distinguishes between people on grounds of suspected propensity for
potential or actual criminality is criminalising to some degree. For example, racial and
ethnic profiling by police has been strenuously objected to on the grounds that it
criminalises not only the individuals it subjects to police interference but entire racial
or ethnic groups (Lever 2007; Hadjimatheou 2012). In some cases, criminalisation
occurs even if the measure is justified all things considered. For example, border
officials may respond with surveillance to intelligence about a people trafficking ring
operated by individuals from a certain ethnic background travelling between specific
locations. The surveillance may be criminalising of people with that ethnic background,
even if the victims that the policy is designed to protect share that background, but the
criminalisation would not be wrongful if the evidence is reliable enough. We can
conclude from this discussion that surveillance that targets groups or individuals is
not inherently wrongfully criminalising but can be and indeed is used both in ways that
criminalise wrongfully and in ways that do not.
It is not necessary for the purposes of this paper to try to determine which kinds of
surveillance are more likely to criminalise wrongfully and therefore which can be said
legitimately to undermine the presumption of innocence. The aim of the paper is to try to
understand the impact on the presumption of innocence of surveillance practices in general
and in light of the possibility that they can and are used in ways that protect people from
wrongful charge and conviction. The first part of that project is now complete: surveillance
practices can and do but need not be used in ways that undermine the presumption of
innocence by treating people wrongfully as criminal. We can now turn to the second part of
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the project which is concerned with developing a better understanding of how surveillance
practices might prevent erroneous charge and convictions.
4 Reducing Erroneous Convictions: the Role of Evidence Gathered
from Surveillance
This section proposes the following, unintuitive, and no doubt controversial thesis:
surveillance practices can and to some extent already do protect innocent people from
being erroneously charged and convicted with crimes and thus promote the presump-
tion of innocence. They do so primarily by providing a source of data that can be used
as evidence to rule out suspects from investigations and thus spare them the significant
burdens of being charged or convicted with crimes they did not commit. This is
achieved in three ways: first, by correcting tunnel vision in police investigations;
second, by reducing the rate of false confessions; and third, by increasing exculpatory
evidence available to the defence. Recent empirical work from the USA and UK on the
causes of erroneous charge and conviction is drawn upon to develop these claims.
Social scientists are testing and substantiating theories about the causes of erroneous
charge and conviction that are compelling and should influence the direction and focus of
this debate over the impact of surveillance on the presumption of innocence. One such
insight is that, contrary to what some legal theorists assume (Naughton 2007), erroneous
convictions are not caused to any significant extent by the relaxation of rules of evidence,
such as the admission of hearsay or bad character evidence (Gould et al. 2013). Rather,
they are the result of one or more of the following factors: eyewitness misidentification,
false confessions, poor defence and/or prosecution, and (much less significantly) error in
the interpretation of forensic evidence (Ibid). All factors are both causes of and caused by
the presence of ‘tunnel vision’ amongst police: that is, the common heuristics and logical
fallacies that lead police to ‘focus on a suspect, select and filter the evidence that will
Bbuild a case^ for conviction, while ignoring or suppressing evidence that points away
from guilt’ (Martin 2002:847–848). As a result of this and other research, tunnel vision is
now widely recognised to be a pivotal factor in erroneous conviction.
Tunnel vision tends to set in early in a criminal investigation. It is therefore
unsurprising that the research also suggests that the causes of erroneous charges and
convictions lie in errors that are most effectively corrected by measures taken in the
relatively early stages of a case. Because research suggests that such errors become
entrenched and amplified with each stage of the criminal justice process, relying on
relatively late-stage court-room procedures to correct them is not the most effective
strategy. Corrective interventions must be made much earlier and preferably before
suspects are officially charged with criminal offences (Gould et al. 2013: 85).3
3 The results of this research complement recent, empirically informed normative work on systemic unfair-
nesses in the criminal justice system, which has been effective in highlighting the impact of crime-preventive
surveillance practices by police on the outcomes of the criminal justice system. An excellent example is
Bernard Harcourt’s work predicting the impact of racial profiling on highways by police on the relative crime
rates of different ethnic groups as well as the overall rate of crime (Harcourt 2006). This strand of research is
not directly relevant to the issue of wrongful criminalisation, but it draws attention to the fact that investigative
choices about who to single out for and who to exclude from suspicion, even at a very preliminary stage of
crime prevention, can have predictable, morally significant knock-on effects on the outcomes of criminal trials.
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How might surveillance practices, such as open-street CCTV, ANPR, and DNA
databases, play a part in the reduction of erroneous charge and conviction? There are at
least three ways. First, evidence gathered via surveillance holds the potential to correct
or obstruct the development of tunnel vision in police and thus to counteract what the
research suggests is the single most significant factor in erroneous convictions. The
most obvious way in which this might be done is by incorporating the collection of
evidence from surveillance into measures designed to combat tunnel vision. For
example, in countries such as Canada and the Netherlands, recent attempts to reform
police investigatory practices in ways that counter tunnel vision include the appoint-
ment of ‘contrarians’ or devil’s advocates (Salet and Terpstra 2013). These are indi-
vidual officers acting in an independent capacity, often brought in from an external
force, whose role is to challenge investigative decisions with a view to preventing the
development of biases or assumptions that risk influencing the direction of an inves-
tigation. It is unclear as yet how successful such initiatives have been but expectations
are high (Ibid). Contrarians can and should point out to investigative officers where
data gathered by surveillance technologies could provide evidence that might exculpate
suspects and should therefore be collected.
Now, it may be argued that technology is a tool and that, no matter how reliable it is, it
will not help improve criminal justice unless it is used properly. The example of
contrarians just given lends support to this: it is the appointment of the contrarian that
will make the real difference, not the availability of surveillance data. As long as the
approach of a police unit to criminal investigation is geared to the confirmation of a
hypothesis rather than the discovery of the truth, the technology will be used in the service
of that purpose and the problem of tunnel vision will persist. Unless and until we change
the mindset, it might be argued, talk of the potential of technologies is largely irrelevant.
While this argument has some merit, it is a little too quick. If used as a matter of
routine, certain technologies can correct tunnel vision and thereby reduce the risk of
wrongful conviction. The most obvious example is the use of DNA, fingerprinting, and
other forensic techniques. The success of DNA testing in particular in the correction of
miscarriages of justice is undeniable. When DNA evidence is available and reliable, it
can provide the much-needed objectivity to cut through tunnel vision and protect
innocent suspects from becoming defendants or even convicted criminals. Might some
of the advantages of DNA evidence also be shared by evidence gathered by surveil-
lance? There is reason to think it might.
Let us consider CCTV. The routine collection (but not examination of) footage
collected by CCTV from around a crime scene could help to combat tunnel vision by
providing exculpatory evidence. Though the UK is famous for being one of the most
videoed countries in the world, most CCTV footage is deleted within 3 weeks of being
recorded. Even assuming that investigating police decide they want to access the
footage, it may have been deleted by the time they get around to it. In practice, police
in the UK will often fail to access footage of a crime scene unless they need further
evidence to recommend prosecution of the person they believe has committed the
crime.4 Suspects in criminal cases are increasingly requesting access to such footage,
which they claim will be exculpatory, and finding that it has been deleted.5 Retaining
4 Private conversation with police officer from London’s Metropolitan Police Service
5 Conversation with UK defence barrister Simon McKay
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footage as a matter of course and analysing it at least in those cases in which it promises
to reveal evidence material to the innocence or guilt of a suspect is one way in which
evidence gathered from surveillance technologies could be used to reduce the risks of
unjust convictions.
These points will gain force in the future as facial recognition techniques become
more and more reliable. In the UK, the use of super-recognisers, that is individuals who
are exceptionally good at identifying individuals from even quite poor-quality CCTV
footage and photographs, is increasing in recent years, both in the pre-trial and in the
trial phases of a criminal case. Super-recognisers are far more effective at identifying
individuals from footage and images gathered from surveillance than any current facial-
recognition technology on the market.6 At the time of writing, efforts are being made to
develop certification for such individuals, which would establish their credentials as
forensic experts in court. The use of super-recognisers in conjunction with CCTV
footage could also reduce the reliance on line-ups and other opportunities for witness
identification. The unreliability of witness identification is notorious, yet evidence
shows that it is still relied upon by police and prosecutors, and thus continues to be a
persistent factor in erroneous conviction (Gould et al. 2013: 95).
In the light of these developments, the requirement to gather CCTV footage from crime
scenes may conceivably (and arguably should) acquire a legal status in the future. While
police are required to reveal exculpatory evidence already in their possession, they are in
most jurisdictions not required to gather it in the first place. UK regulation goes further
than most countries in requiring police investigators by law to pursue all ‘reasonable lines
of inquiry’. As public knowledge of available sources of evidence grows, it is possible that
police may find themselves the targets of legal action if, for example, those convicted of
crimes claim the existence of potentially exonerating CCTV evidence that police could
have but failed to retrieve. AsMacFarlane (2008) notes, this route to legal challenge is not
often of much use to defendants today because much hangs on what is ‘reasonable’ and
because it relies on an after-the-fact challenge from the defendant, rather than building in
safeguards from the start. Nevertheless, as digital evidence-gathering and analysis tech-
niques become easier and cheaper, legal perceptions of what is reasonable may shift to
incorporate routine gathering of evidence from surveillance.
Second, routine collection and retention of surveillance data relevant to a crime—
such as CCTV footage, ANPR data, and communications metadata—can reduce the
rate of false confessions by reassuring those accused that their innocence can be
revealed. In the USA, one in four cases of exonerations via DNA evidence revealed
wrongful conviction on the basis of a false confession.7 In the UK, recent psychological
work shows that between 10 and 20 % of repeat criminals report having made false
confessions (Gudjonsson 2011). One of the main causes is pressure or manipulation by
police interrogators, and a compounding factor is the perception amongst suspects that
their case will result inevitably in a guilty verdict. If such suspects knew their defence
team would have access to all available data from their communications as well as
6 See ‘The Police Super Recognisers Putting Names to Faces’ Lauren Potts, BBC News, 19 Oct. 2015 at http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-34544199.
7 See the USA’s Innocence Project for explanation of the causes of false confession: http://www.
innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction/false-confessions-or-admissions.
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open-street surveillance such as CCTV and ANPR, they may well be more confident
about their chances of being found innocent and decide not to plead guilty.
Third, making surveillance evidence available to the legal teams of those accused
can help them defend more successfully their clients, thus addressing another major
factor in wrongful convictions. Writing in relation to the UK, Naughton describes how
the current system puts the entire responsibility and indeed right to gather evidence on
the shoulders of the police and prosecution and thus:
…renders suspects of crime passive, which simultaneously justified minimal
resources to the defence, whilst the ‘burden’ places pressure on, and directs the
bulk of the resources to, the police and prosecution to chip away at the presumed
innocent stats and construct cases from only incriminating evidence that might
obtain a conviction, rendering innocent victims vulnerable to wrongful convic-
tions (Naughton 2011: 41).
Naughton proposes making evidence-gathering techniques available to defence
teams as well as police and prosecutors (Ibid). Giving defendants automatic access to
all the data that has recorded their own activities and has been retained already would
go some way to empowering defendants to protect themselves against wrongful
conviction.
Before we go on to consider the normative implications of the claims put
forward in this section about the potential impact of surveillance evidence on the
rate of wrongful charges and convictions, it is important to acknowledge that they
are speculative. At the time of writing, no empirical study has yet been published
examining the current and potential role of evidence gathered by surveillance in
the ruling out of suspects from criminal investigations or even in their acquittal in
trials. This should be contrasted with the considerable amount of work done that
attempts to assess the impact of surveillance techniques and powers on the
prevention, detection, and prosecution of crime.8 The disparity is explained by
the fact that the democratic authorisation of such techniques and powers is justified
by reference to their role as a means of increasing security against crime and not
as a means of promoting the presumption of innocence.
One upshot of this is that it is difficult to assess the extent to which data that is
already gathered for crime prevention and detection purposes could be put to use in
ways that prevent quite serious kinds of erroneous criminalisation. For the purposes of
this paper, however, it is sufficient to have shown that surveillance data has significant
potential to be put to such use and that to some extent that is already occurring. It is
worth noting, too, that erroneous charge and conviction are much more harmful to
individuals than many of the most common kinds of interferences imposed via
surveillance, such as for example being wrongfully singled out for a search at an
airport. What are the implications of this conclusion for our assessment of the impact of
surveillance practices on the presumption of innocence, given what has already been
argued about their potential to undermine it by wrongfully criminalising some people?
8 For example, many studies have been undertaken around the world into the effectiveness of CCTV as a
crime prevention and detection measure (Germain et al 2013).
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5 The Normative Implications of the Impact of Surveillance
on the Presumption of Innocence
If what has been argued thus far is correct, surveillance practices have the potential both
to undermine the presumption of innocence, by wrongfully criminalising some via the
imposition of suspicion, and to promote it, by protecting others from being erroneously
charged or convicted. How should these conclusions determine our understanding of
the impact of surveillance practices overall on the presumption of innocence? Is it
possible to say that surveillance protects the presumption of innocence overall, because
the criminalisation it has the potential to prevent (i.e. erroneous conviction) is more
serious than that it inflicts (i.e. wrongful suspicion)? Or must we say that surveillance
both undermines and protects the presumption of innocence?9
Neither solution is without its difficulties. On the one hand, the fact that the
criminalisation of innocents overall might be reduced by surveillance practices does
not mean we are justified in failing to acknowledge the wrongful criminalisation
suffered by some. Yet at least this aggregative approach gives us a basis on which to
make some assessment of the all-things-considered impact of those measures on the
presumption of innocence, an assessment that can feed into decisions about the overall
justifiability of such practices. On the other hand, the second option, which does not
aggregate wrongful suspicion and erroneous conviction, seems to describe more
accurately the impact of surveillance on the presumption of innocence. Yet, at first
glance at least, it seems less helpful than the first, because it does not yield any clear
overall assessment that can inform broader policy considerations.
Notwithstanding these considerations, there is at least one compelling reason why
we should prefer the second, non-aggregative option above the first. The aggregative
option is the kind of crude aggregative utilitarian approach to determining interference
with the presumption of innocence, which would weigh the wrongful suspicion
inflicted by surveillance against the erroneous charge and conviction prevented. This
utilitarian reasoning would also take into account the fact that erroneous charge and
conviction involves harm to interests that are more vital to people’s well-being than
those affected by wrongful suspicion, and conclude therefore that the prevention of the
former outweighs the prevention of the latter.
This approach would not be accepted by theorists of a deontological persuasion as a
valid basis for assessment, as it assumes that unfairnesses to some can be justified by
reference to the benefits gained by others. The opposition to such trade-offs could not
be more formidable. Two of the twentieth century’s most important political philoso-
phers, Rawls and Nozick, have argued that trade-offs between individuals are incom-
patible with respect for people, because it fails to recognise what has become known as
the ‘separateness of persons’. In the words of Nozick: ‘To use a person [for another’s
benefit] does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate
person, that his is the only life he has. He does not get some overbalancing good from
his sacrifice’ (Nozick 1974: 33.). Not everyone would agree that this objection is fatal,
but it is serious enough to suggest that an alternative to the utilitarian approach should
be explored.
9 The choice between these two options is not a choice between two normative implications but a choice
between two ways of conceptualising the impact.
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One possible alternative is suggested by considering a further objection to the
aggregative utilitarian position: that objection from what has become known as the
‘doctrine of acts and omissions’. The doctrine of acts and omissions states that it is
worse to inflict harm than to fail to intervene to prevent it. Though support for this
doctrine is waning in moral philosophy, it still features regularly in moral arguments, in
part at least because there is a clear sense in which it chimes with common sense moral
intuitions.10 Philosophical proponents of this position assert that the state’s duty to
refrain from harming innocents must take priority over its duty to prevent harm inflicted
on innocents by others (Kagan 1992). Applied to the issue at hand, it would suggest
that wrongful suspicion caused by surveillance is a harm against innocents and should
therefore be avoided even if the practices that cause it also prevent erroneous convic-
tion. In other words, the doctrine of acts and omissions yields a clear argument for
states to refrain from surveillance when and to the extent that it visits on innocent
individuals’ wrongful criminalisation in any of its forms. If this argument were
accepted, it seems we may have sufficient grounds not only to reject the aggregative
utilitarian approach to assessing the impact of surveillance on the presumption of
innocence but also to resolve the apparent dilemma posed by the non-aggregative
approach: if we are prohibited from inflicting wrongful criminalisation of any kind,
then we are prohibited from carrying out many of those very surveillance practices that
might also help prevent erroneous convictions.
However, there are strong reasons to reject this line of argument, reasons that could be
accepted even by those whose intuitions insist on some distinction between acts and
omissions. Let us consider two such reasons. First, the doctrine of acts and omissions
can be interpreted more flexibly than it has been presented above. Therefore, it need not
be taken to mean that inflicting harm is alwaysworse than failing to intervene to prevent
it, a principle which seems implausible. If using evidence gathered from surveillance can
prevent a great amount of criminal harm by inflicting on innocents a very small rise in
the numbers of people being treated as criminally suspicious, it may be reconcilable with
some more moderate version of the distinction between acts and omissions.
Second, and more importantly, in relation to surveillance practices, the objection to
the aggregative approach offered by an appeal to the doctrine of acts and omissions
assumes a conflict in practice between the imperative to refrain from wrongful
criminalisation and the duty to prevent erroneous conviction. In fact, there is no such
conflict. The tendency of surveillance practices to inflict wrongful suspicion on some
innocents can be reduced without at the same time reducing the potential of those
practices to be used in ways that protect individuals from erroneous charge and
conviction. This is the case because, as was argued before, surveillance need not
(although it has been in practice) be used in ways that undermine the presumption of
innocence by imposing suspicion on people and thus criminalising them, wrongfully.
The adjustments that would need to be made to avoid such wrongful criminalisation do
not prejudice in any way the availability of the kind of data that could be used to
exculpate or otherwise rule out of suspicion those already subject to police investiga-
tion. In other words, it is possible to practice surveillance in such a way as to reduce the
number of individuals wrongfully criminalised at the low end of the spectrum of
10 Teson (2005) offers one of the few well-thought out contemporary defences of the principle.
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suspicion, while at the same time increasing the protection for those at risk of much
more serious criminalisation.
Therefore, the second non-aggregative option put forward above, namely to try to
recognise both the ways in which surveillance undermines and the ways in which it
protects the presumption of innocence, need not lead to normative paralysis. Instead,
combined with the claims made above about the actual and potential impact of
surveillance practices on wrongful suspicion and erroneous conviction, it yields a clear
take-home message, namely that we should adapt state use of surveillance so that the
former is reduced and the latter strengthened.
Too often criticisms of surveillance consist of lists of the various ways in which it
undermines our most treasured and fundamental values. Rarely are systematic attempts
made to reflect upon the potential benefits to such values, especially those other than
security. This paper has attempted to go some way towards rectifying this and to reflect
on the normative implications of its analysis in a way that supports clear recommen-
dations for action.
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